Why It Matters

The United States has a formal process for selling weapons to foreign governments. Congress wrote the rules. But a new Congressional Research Service report updated May 13, 2026, makes clear that the Trump administration has found a reliable way around them, and that Congress has almost no practical tools to stop it.

The central tension in congressional arms sales review is straightforward: the executive branch controls foreign policy, but Congress holds the constitutional authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and has long asserted a role in overseeing weapons transfers. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) was supposed to be the mechanism that balanced those interests.

In practice, the report documents a system in which the President holds nearly all the cards.

Congress has never successfully blocked a proposed arms sale through a joint resolution of disapproval, the primary tool the AECA provides. The reason is structural. Even if both chambers pass such a resolution, the President can veto it. Overriding that veto requires a two-thirds majority in both the House and Senate, a threshold that has never been reached on an arms sale.

Add to that the emergency waiver authority under AECA Section 36, which allows the President to bypass the congressional notification window entirely by declaring that an emergency exists requiring an immediate sale in the national security interests of the United States, and the oversight framework begins to look more like a formality than a check.

The Big Picture

The Notification System

Under the AECA, the President must formally notify Congress before proceeding with major foreign military sales. For most countries, that window is 30 calendar days. For sales to NATO member states, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, the review period is 15 days, and the dollar thresholds triggering notification are higher.

For government-to-government Foreign Military Sales, the 30-day clock applies to major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, and design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. Direct Commercial Sales, in which U.S. defense firms sell directly to foreign governments under State Department licenses, follow similar thresholds.

Before formal notification, the State Department has since 1976 submitted informal, classified notifications to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, typically 20 to 40 days in advance. The department "generally will not formally notify an arms transfer if a member of Congress raises significant concerns by placing a hold during the informal review stage," according to a 2020 State Department Inspector General report cited in the Congressional Research Service (CRS) document. But the department is not legally required to honor that hold.

Congressional Review Procedure

The AECA created expedited congressional review procedures for disapproval resolutions in both chambers. In the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee must report on any disapproval resolution within 10 calendar days of its introduction. Debate is limited and amendments are restricted. In the House, a disapproval resolution reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee must be treated as "highly privileged," meaning it can be brought to the floor without a special rule from the Rules Committee.

These procedures were designed to give Congress a real opportunity to act quickly. The historical record suggests they have not been enough.

Political Stakes

For the Administration

The Trump administration's use of emergency waiver authority has been extensive and accelerating. Secretary of State Marco Rubio invoked AECA Section 36 emergency provisions for arms sales to Israel in February 2025, March 2026, and May 2026. The sales included bulldozers and large-diameter bombs in February 2025, general purpose bombs and small diameter bombs in March 2026, and 10,000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II rounds in May 2026.

The same emergency authority was used in March and May 2026 for sales to the United Arab Emirates, covering a Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System, a Long-Range Discrimination Radar, Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles, F-16 munitions, and an Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System. Jordan received emergency-designated aircraft and munitions support equipment in March 2026. Kuwait received Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor Radars in March 2026 and an Integrated Battle Command System in May 2026. Qatar received PATRIOT Air and Missile Defense replenishment services and 10,000 APKWS-II rounds in May 2026.

The pattern reflects a deliberate policy posture: arm Middle East partners quickly, without waiting for congressional review windows to close.

For Congress

The AECA arms sales oversight framework was built on the assumption that the emergency waiver would be used sparingly. The current volume of emergency determinations, applied to multiple countries within the same weeks, tests that assumption.

The report is careful not to editorialize, but the documentation speaks for itself. The administration is using emergency authority not as a last resort but as a routine instrument, effectively converting the 15- and 30-day review windows into optional delays.

For members of Congress who want to push back, the tools are limited. A joint resolution of disapproval requires committee action, floor votes in both chambers, and then survives only if the President does not veto it. The CRS report notes that Congress can also use regular legislation, including appropriations riders or standalone bills, to block or modify a sale at any point before delivery. But that path requires the same legislative math, and the same veto threat applies.

For Democrats and the Public

Democrats have repeatedly introduced disapproval resolutions targeting arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Israel over the past decade, with little to show for it. In 2021, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced a resolution prohibiting air-delivered munitions to Israel, with a companion bill introduced by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Neither advanced. In 2019, the Senate passed three resolutions blocking Saudi Arabia and UAE sales, but President Trump vetoed all three and the Senate failed to override.

The public dimension of this debate has grown sharper as arms sales to Israel have continued through an active conflict. The CRS report does not assess the policy wisdom of those sales, but it does document that the emergency waiver has been used to move those sales forward without the standard review period, and that Congress has not found a way to stop them.

The Bottom Line

The congressional arms sales review process, as documented in this CRS report, is a system in which the executive branch holds structural advantages that have proven, in practice, to be decisive. The joint resolution of disapproval has never worked. The emergency waiver has been used repeatedly by administrations of both parties, and the current administration has applied it at a pace and volume that is notable even by historical standards.

For Congress, the report is a reminder that oversight authority on paper and oversight authority in practice are two different things. The foreign military sales approval process gives lawmakers a window to object. It does not give them a reliable way to prevail.

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