Why It Matters

As President Trump touches down in Beijing today for the first American presidential visit to China since his own 2017 trip, a newly updated Congressional Research Service report on U.S.-China relations lays out a relationship defined by contradictions: conciliatory rhetoric paired with aggressive trade actions, diplomatic summitry alongside legal battles over tariff authority, and a Congress pushing back on an administration that has quietly dismantled key China-policy institutions.

The report, updated May 11, offers Congress a timely baseline as it weighs oversight and legislation across one of the most consequential foreign policy relationships in the world.

The central tension in U.S.-China bilateral relations right now is not whether the two countries are competitors. It is whether the Trump administration's stated desire for "stable peace" and a "mutually advantageous economic relationship" can coexist with actions that look a great deal like the strategic competition framework it has formally abandoned.

The administration's two major public strategy documents, the National Security Strategy released in December 2025 and the National Defense Strategy released in January 2026, use language that is, as the CRS puts it, "in places conciliatory and in other places combative." The NSS does not explicitly identify China as a competitor. The NDS states the goal is "not to dominate China" and that U.S. defense strategy "does not require regime change." Yet the same document pledges to "prioritize defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China."

The Big Picture

Trade Policy Hits Legal Walls

The Trump administration's China trade policy has run into a series of courtroom setbacks that have significantly narrowed its options.

After the Supreme Court ruled in early 2026 that President Trump could not use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose tariffs, the administration lifted those tariffs and pivoted to a 10 percent global tariff for 150 days under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. In May 2026, a panel on the U.S. International Court of Trade found that the Section 122 tariff also could not legally be imposed on most imports.

What remains are non-IEEPA tariffs and sectoral tariffs imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, along with a U.S. Trade Representative investigation of 16 trading partners, including China, over structural excess manufacturing capacity under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer has said he is seeking a "managed trade" arrangement with China, an approach that typically sets import and export quotas. The CRS report flags a concern about this approach: PRC offers to resume purchases it had withheld during negotiations, including aircraft, beef, and soybeans, raising questions about whether any commitments would actually boost U.S. exports above normal levels, or simply restore a prior baseline.

The report also raises a pointed question about the administration's decision to approve the export of Nvidia's advanced chips to China. Some former U.S. officials, the report notes, have said the decision "appears to have traded U.S. national security decisions for trade concessions," a shift from past practice.

Institutional Capacity Is Being Reduced

Alongside its diplomatic engagement, the administration has made structural changes to the executive branch that the CRS report documents in detail. The White House National Security Council's Technology and National Security Directorate has been eliminated. The administration has sought to reduce the U.S. Agency for Global Media, which funds Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, both of which broadcast into China, to "the minimum presence and function required by law." The Department of State eliminated the position of Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and reduced the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

USAID's co-administration of the Countering PRC Influence Fund has ended, with the State Department now serving as the sole administrator.

Congress has pushed back. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75) appropriates not less than $400 million for the Countering PRC Influence Fund and funds entities the administration has sought to defund, including the USAGM. The FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 119-60) includes provisions on U.S. outbound investment to China.

Taiwan and the Beijing Summit

The stakes of this week's summit extend well beyond trade. In a February 2026 call with President Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping identified Taiwan as "the most important issue in U.S.-China relations" and urged the President to "handle the issue of arms sales to Taiwan with prudence."

PRC scholars, the report notes, have suggested Xi may use the May summit to press Trump to limit Taiwan arms sales and to request that the President state his opposition to Taiwan independence and his support for China's quest for "peaceful unification." The CRS is direct about what that would mean: "Such statements would be a departure from longstanding U.S. policy." The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8) legally obligates the United States to make available to Taiwan defense articles and services sufficient for self-defense.

The NDS makes no explicit mention of Taiwan, though it does state the department's intention to "erect a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain," the string of islands that includes Japan, Taiwan, and parts of the Philippines and Indonesia.

The Iran Complication

The report highlights a separate pressure point that cuts across the diplomatic moment. China is the largest importer of Iranian crude oil. On April 24, 2026, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated five China-based oil refineries for sanctions. On May 2, China's Ministry of Commerce publicly ordered Chinese companies not to comply with those sanctions, the first time China has taken such an action.

Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent called on China on May 4 to "step up with some diplomacy and get the Iranians to open the strait," a reference to the Strait of Hormuz. The Financial Times, the report notes, had earlier reported that Iran used a satellite purchased from a Chinese company in 2024 to target U.S. military assets in the Middle East.

Political Stakes

For the Administration

The Beijing summit is the highest-profile diplomatic event of Trump's second term with China. Sixteen U.S. executives are accompanying the President, signaling the commercial weight the administration is placing on the visit. But any concession on Taiwan, whether on arms sales or unification language, would face immediate scrutiny from Congress and from U.S. allies in the region.

The administration's tariff strategy has been legally constrained by two separate court rulings in less than a year. That limits its leverage heading into negotiations and raises questions about whether a "managed trade" deal can deliver the structural changes the U.S. has long sought from China's economy.

For Congress

The 119th Congress has positioned itself as a counterweight on the competitive dimension of U.S.-China relations. It re-authorized the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party via H.Res. 5, used appropriations to fund institutions the administration sought to cut, and is considering additional legislation to strengthen export controls and protect the U.S. market.

Congressional Member travel to China has resumed at a low level. The 119th Congress accounts for three of the four Member delegations to visit China since 2019.

For the Public

The legal erosion of the administration's tariff tools, combined with a diplomatic push that could involve concessions on Taiwan, creates genuine uncertainty about the direction of U.S. policy. The question is whether a summit-driven approach produces durable agreements or short-term deals that sidestep the structural issues, from PRC subsidies to technology transfer, that have defined U.S. concerns about China for nearly a decade.

The Bottom Line

The CRS report, updated two days before the Beijing summit, captures a U.S.-China relationship in which the administration's rhetoric has softened but the underlying tensions have not. Courts have stripped away the administration's primary tariff tools. Congress is funding institutions that the executive branch is trying to reduce. And Xi is expected to press Trump directly on Taiwan at a summit where 16 American business executives are also in the room.

The one thing the report makes clear: the gap between "stable peace" as a stated goal and the reality of competing interests across trade, technology, Taiwan, and Iran is wide, and closing it will require more than a summit.

Access the Legis1 platform for comprehensive political news, data, and insights.