Yemen's Unresolved War Poses Compounding Risks for U.S. Policy

Why It Matters

Yemen has been at war for more than a decade, but the stakes for U.S. policy have rarely been higher. A new Congressional Research Service report on the Yemen crisis lands at a fraught moment, as the Trump Administration navigates a ceasefire with the Houthis, a broader conflict with Iran, and a humanitarian catastrophe that is deepening by the month, with no clear resolution in sight.

The Houthi movement controls the capital, Sana'a, and much of western Yemen, where most of the population lives. It holds a terrorist designation and has demonstrated the ability to strike targets more than 1,300 miles away disrupting one of the world's most critical shipping corridors. Meanwhile, the anti-Houthi coalition that the United States and its partners have supported is fracturing under the weight of a Saudi-UAE rivalry that boiled over into open military confrontation in late 2025.

The central tension is this: the tools the administration has used, military force, sanctions, and limited negotiation, have not produced a durable outcome. The Houthis endured Operation Rough Rider, the U.S. strike campaign that ran from March to May 2025. They accepted a ceasefire that covers only U.S. vessels, resumed attacks on other ships by July 2025, and continued long-range strikes on Israel. The U.S. Intelligence Community's 2026 Annual Threat Assessment assessed that the Houthis "remain a resilient challenger to U.S. and partner interests in the region, and their military capabilities and strategic location on the Red Sea allow them to try to extort concessions from the international community."

The Big Picture

The Yemen conflict overview in the CRS report describes a situation where neither side can win outright and where the coalition nominally opposing the Houthis is itself at war with its own members. The Saudi Arabia-backed Internationally Recognized Government and its Presidential Leadership Council were dealt a significant blow when the Southern Transitional Council, an independence-seeking coalition backed by the UAE, moved in December 2025 to assert security control across southern Yemen. Saudi Arabia responded with airstrikes on STC positions. The UAE subsequently withdrew from Yemen entirely. Two STC leaders were expelled from the PLC.

Saudi Arabia has since emerged as the dominant external actor, committing $346.6 million for IRG public sector salaries and restructuring the coalition. But the report is clear-eyed about the limits of that consolidation: as of April 2026, the IRG's reach remains limited, local authorities and armed groups remain influential, and STC supporters continue to call for self-determination. Mass demonstrations have illustrated continuing popular support for the STC. IRG-aligned security units have responded with force to some protests, resulting in deaths, injuries, and accusations of excessive force.

Iran, the Houthis, and a Widening Conflict

The 2026 U.S./Israel-Iran conflict, which began in February, has added a new layer of risk to Yemen political instability. Disruptions to transit in the Strait of Hormuz have increased the importance of the Red Sea corridor for international energy markets, making any resumption of Houthi attacks on vessels potentially more consequential. Houthi leader Abdul Malik Al Houthi said on April 10, "Should the enemies resume escalation in this round against the Islamic Republic of Iran and the countries of the Axis, our position will remain steadfast through active participation within an escalating course of military operations."

Iran has provided the Houthis with components and technical knowledge to construct long-range missiles, rockets, and UAVs, and Houthi fighters have trained at an Iranian naval academy. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Maj. Gen. Ali Abdollahi warned in April that if a U.S. blockade of Iran-linked shipping "creates insecurity," then "Iran's powerful armed forces will not allow any exports or imports to continue in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and the Red Sea."

The Houthis have conducted limited attacks on Israel in the context of the current conflict but have not resumed strikes on vessels or neighboring Arab states. The report notes that the group may be weighing Iran's support capacity, likely U.S. and regional responses, and the risks of renewed conflict.

The Yemen Humanitarian Situation

According to the UN Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for 2026, 22.3 million people, more than half of Yemen's population, are in need of humanitarian assistance and protection. Five million are internally displaced. More than 18 million face acute food insecurity.

The 2026 UN humanitarian appeal sought $2.16 billion and was only 12.9 percent funded as of May 4, 2026. The World Food Programme has been forced to cut the number of people receiving food aid in IRG-controlled areas from 3.4 million to 1.7 million due to donor funding reductions. In Houthi-controlled areas, the WFP has reduced operations because the Houthis have detained more than 70 UN and aid workers.

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization assessed in March 2026 that "Yemen's food security outlook remains extremely dire across all governorates," and projected that "regional instability, elevated global food prices, falling household incomes and localized access constraints" will amplify related risks. A senior UN official described Yemen's health system as "collapsing" at an April 2026 Security Council briefing.

Yemen imports nearly 90 percent of its wheat and the fuel to mill it, making its food supply acutely vulnerable to any disruption in maritime commerce. Yemen humanitarian aid flows are already strained, and the Strait of Hormuz disruptions threaten to make a bad situation worse.

Political Stakes

For the Administration

The Trump Administration faces a strategic trilemma with no clean exit. The CRS report identifies three options, each with significant downsides. Renewed military confrontation with the Houthis risks "disruptive conflict, additional operational costs, and uncertain outcomes." Accepting the status quo "extends uncertainty and inherent security and humanitarian risks." Negotiating with the Houthis "may contribute to legitimizing the Houthis' role in Yemen's governance."

The administration has not named a Special Envoy for Yemen, relying instead on Special Envoy Steve Witkoff for indirect Houthi talks through Oman and Special Adviser Massad Boulos for engagement with the PLC. The Yemen US policy picture is further complicated by the administration's termination of Temporary Protected Status for Yemenis in the United States, effective May 4, 2026, a decision that drew pushback from some House members who argued for redesignation.

In May 2026, President Trump issued a one-year continuation of the national emergency with respect to Yemen, stating that Houthi "actions and policies...continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."

For Congress

Members of the 119th Congress have expressed varying views on Operation Rough Rider, with some praising it for degrading Houthi capabilities and others questioning whether the president had authority to initiate it without formal congressional endorsement. The war powers question remains unresolved.

On the legislative front, companion bills in the House and Senate, the Houthi Human Rights Accountability Act (H.R. 1848/S. 3451), would require recurring determinations of sanctions eligibility for Houthi restrictions on humanitarian access, human rights abuses, and the detention of U.S. nationals. The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act also authorized the U.S. military to treat weapons seized from Houthi-bound shipments as U.S. stocks and required assessments of the Yemen Coast Guard's capacity.

The report signals that Congress may also need to examine how security assistance to Yemen and neighboring countries is structured, how U.S. policy may adapt to longer-term regional security risks, and what tradeoffs expanded maritime security operations would entail.

The Bottom Line

The most immediate concern is the Red Sea. Shipping disruptions have global economic consequences, and the Houthis retain the demonstrated capacity to reignite them. The humanitarian dimension, where more than 22 million Yemenis need assistance and international funding has fallen dramatically short, represents a slow-moving crisis that regional conflict could accelerate into something far worse.

The CRS report makes clear that the Yemen crisis does not lend itself to a clean resolution. The Houthis have survived sustained military pressure, the anti-Houthi coalition is more divided than at any point in recent memory, and the humanitarian system is operating well below the threshold needed to meet basic needs.

For Congress and the administration, the report's most pointed message may be this: the choices available are not between good options and bad ones. They are between different categories of risk, and the cost of getting the calculation wrong, whether through renewed conflict, a legitimizing negotiation, or prolonged inaction, is measured in both strategic and human terms.

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