Bangladesh Stalls Democratic Reforms After Political Power Consolidation

Why It Matters

The CRS Report on recent Bangladesh political developments comes as Washington is trying to balance a trade deal, a China competition agenda, and human rights obligations in a country of 176 million people that has undergone a complete political overhaul in less than two years.

The Trump Administration wants to deepen economic and security ties with a new Bangladeshi government, while that government is consolidating power in ways that raise democratic red flags, including banning its main political rival and stalling on the very reforms it was elected to implement.

The Big Picture

Bangladesh's transformation began in August 2024, when student-led protests toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina just seven months into her fourth consecutive term after security forces killed up to 1,400 demonstrators, according to a February 2025 UN fact-finding report. Hasina fled to India, and Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as interim leader.

Yunus governed for 18 months, initiating a reform process that produced the July National Charter, a sweeping proposal to overhaul Bangladesh's constitution, judiciary, electoral system, police, and anti-corruption mechanisms. On February 12, Bangladesh held elections alongside a referendum on the Charter. Sixty-eight percent of voters endorsed it. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party, led by Tarique Rahman, won a parliamentary supermajority, and Rahman was sworn in as prime minister on February 17.

The problem is that the BNP has since refused to join the Constitution Reform Council, the body responsible for actually implementing the Charter. Some analysts foresee what one report called "political hesitation," which is unsurprising given that the Charter would curb the prime minister's own powers. Meanwhile, in April, Bangladesh's parliament passed an amended Anti-Terrorism Act formally designating the Awami League, the country's other historically dominant party, as a terrorist organization, enshrining a ban that the interim government had imposed in May 2025. One scholar described this as placing Bangladesh "in the constitutionally untenable position of attempting to hold elections and consolidate democratic governance while a major political party and all its affiliates remain legally prohibited from participation." The International Crisis Group has argued the ban is "not sustainable in the long term."

Islamist political forces have also grown. Jamaat-e-Islami, banned under Hasina, was unbanned in August 2024 and won 68 parliamentary seats in February 2026, making it the main opposition force. U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, are reportedly recruiting in Bangladesh. Violence against women has increased, with some activists linking it to the resurgence of conservative religious groups.

Political Stakes

For the Administration

Bangladesh represents both an opportunity and a complication. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has publicly emphasized the partnership, stating in March that "the United States values our longstanding partnership with Bangladesh, anchored in a shared vision for a free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific." The Administration has reportedly prioritized implementation of a trade agreement with the Rahman government.

That trade deal, however, is on uncertain legal footing. Bangladesh and the United States concluded an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade on February 9, setting a 19 percent tariff on most Bangladeshi imports, with a zero percent rate for some apparel and textiles tied to U.S. cotton inputs. The agreement also requires Bangladesh to purchase liquefied natural gas, agricultural products, civilian aircraft, and defense articles from the United States, and includes provisions requiring Bangladesh to limit the role of "countries of national security concern" (a reference to China) in sensitive technology supply chains.

The legal basis for the deal was complicated almost immediately. In February, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose global tariffs. President Trump subsequently imposed a 10 percent global tariff, including on Bangladesh, for 150 days under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. In March, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) launched two separate Section 301 investigations of Bangladesh, one on structural excess manufacturing capacity, and one on forced labor. On June 2, USTR determined that Bangladesh had "failed to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor," specifically related to Chinese-produced cotton presumed under U.S. law to be made with forced labor, and recommended an additional 10 percent duty on Bangladeshi imports. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Bangladesh was $7.1 billion in 2025.

For Democrats

The political situation in Bangladesh offers an opening to press the administration on human rights. Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, including Representatives Gregory Meeks, Bill Huizenga, and Sydney Kamlager-Dove, sent a letter to the interim government in December 2025 urging inclusive, free, and fair elections. Several members have separately raised concerns about violence against Bangladesh's Hindu minority, which comprises about 8 percent of the population and has faced continued attacks since Hasina's ouster, including a December 2025 mob lynching of a Hindu garment worker accused of blasphemy.

In the 119th Congress, H.Res. 1130 would call on President Trump to recognize atrocities committed against ethnic Bengali Hindus by Pakistan's armed forces during Bangladesh's 1971 liberation war as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, a measure that intersects with the broader concern about the rise of Islamist politics in Dhaka. The Burma GAP Act (H.R. 4140) would direct the Secretary of State to support Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, where over one million Rohingya from Burma are sheltered. The Trump Administration announced intent to provide more than $60 million in Rohingya assistance in September 2025, conditioning it on Bangladesh allowing livelihood opportunities for refugees, and on aid organizations improving cost efficiency.

For the Region

India, a close Hasina ally, has lost influence in Dhaka and faces a formal Bangladeshi extradition request for Hasina, who was convicted in absentia of crimes against humanity in November 2025 and sentenced to death. India's Ministry of External Affairs stated in April that the extradition request "is being examined as part of ongoing judicial and internal legal processes." China, meanwhile, accounts for 73 percent of Bangladesh's arms imports, and secured a $2 billion investment and loan commitment from Yunus during his March 2025 trip to Beijing.

The Bottom Line

Bangladesh's democratic transition is incomplete and fragile, and U.S. policy is caught between competing priorities. Washington has a trade deal it wants implemented, a China competition agenda that makes Bangladesh's geography and supply chains strategically important, and a set of human rights and democratic governance concerns that Congress, on both sides of the aisle, has not been willing to ignore.

The BNP's resistance to implementing the very charter voters endorsed, combined with the formal banning of the Awami League, means the democratic gains from 2024 remain contested. As the CRS report notes, Congress has a range of tools available to respond, from foreign assistance conditions to targeted sanctions to trade restrictions. Whether it uses them, and how the administration engages, will shape not just the U.S.-Bangladesh relationship but the credibility of American democratic commitments across South Asia.

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