Why it Matters

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party convenes May 19 for a hearing whose specific focus has not yet been publicly announced, but the committee's recent activity points to a pressure point that has been building for months: whether the United States can actually enforce its own technology restrictions on China before a critical window closes.

Just two weeks before the hearing, Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) sent a formal letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio urging diplomatic engagement with the Dutch government to close what he described as a loophole in the sale of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. The specific concern: Dutch toolmaker ASML reportedly plans to begin shipments of certain advanced lithography systems to China by the end of 2026. If that timeline holds, it would represent a concrete erosion of the export control architecture Congress and the administration have spent years constructing.

That letter, dated May 5, lands the committee squarely in one of the most contested policy debates in Washington — not whether to restrict China's access to advanced chip-making tools, but whether the existing restrictions are working, and whether U.S. allies are holding the line. This comes as President Trump leaves for a summit with China's leader Xi Jinping.

The Semiconductor Stakes

The semiconductor equipment industry has been watching this space closely. ASML US LLC reported $600,000 in lobbying in the First Quarter of 2026 on issues including semiconductor development, manufacturing, and trade, as well as implementation of the CHIPS for America Act. Across five filings over the past year, ASML's U.S. lobbying arm has spent approximately $1.87 million on related issues.

KLA Corporation, another major semiconductor equipment manufacturer, has reported roughly $1.04 million in lobbying over four filings, with disclosures specifically citing "trade policy regarding China" and "tariffs and export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment for advanced models."

Applied Materials has also weighed in, disclosing lobbying on "U.S.-China trade and tariffs," "US export controls and leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technologies," and "outbound investment restrictions." Lam Research and Teradyne have each filed on export control regulations affecting the semiconductor industry as well.

The collective picture is an industry deeply engaged with the policy questions the committee is pressing: who gets to sell what to China, under what conditions, and who enforces it when allies don't fully cooperate.

Pharmaceuticals and the Supply Chain Front

The committee's March 18, 2026 hearing, titled "From the Science Lab to the Medicine Cabinet: How China is Cornering the Market on Our Medicines," established pharmaceutical supply chain dependency as a parallel line of inquiry. That hearing examined how China has positioned itself as a dominant supplier of active pharmaceutical ingredients — a vulnerability that became visible during the pandemic and has not been resolved.

Lobbying around the Mapping America's Pharmaceutical Supply (MAPS) Act reflects the same concern in the private sector. The United States Pharmacopeial Convention has spent approximately $350,000 across four filings on the MAPS Act and related supply chain resilience legislation. Phlow Corp., which focuses on domestic pharmaceutical production, reported $90,000 in First Quarter 2026 lobbying on the same legislation. The American Society of Health-System Pharmacists has also flagged drug supply chain issues and the MAPS Act across its disclosures.

For Congress, the pharmaceutical supply chain question carries a direct public health dimension: dependence on Chinese-manufactured drug ingredients creates a potential leverage point for Beijing and a vulnerability for American patients.

AI, Defense, and the Technology Competition

A third thread running through the committee's recent work involves artificial intelligence and its role in U.S.-China defense competition. Chairman Moolenaar has delivered an opening statement at a hearing titled "China's Campaign to Steal America's AI Edge," reflecting the committee's focus on intellectual property theft and the race to dominate AI-enabled military systems.

Govini, a defense technology firm, has reported $530,000 in lobbying across four filings specifically on "U.S.-China technology, industrial, and defense competition," alongside defense acquisition reform and artificial intelligence. C3.ai has reported $320,000 across four filings on AI in the defense industry.

Marvell Technology and Ampere Computing have each filed disclosures citing U.S.-China trade policy and AI export controls as active concerns.

The Committee and the Moment

The Select Committee, chaired by Moolenaar with Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA) serving as Ranking Member, has operated with notable bipartisan coherence on China policy — a rarity in the current Congress. The committee's membership includes senior lawmakers from both parties across defense, technology, and foreign policy portfolios.

The May 19 hearing arrives as the administration is simultaneously managing a trade dispute with China, navigating export control enforcement with European allies, and fielding pressure from U.S. industry on the economic costs of restrictions. The committee's role is to sustain congressional attention on the strategic dimension of those decisions — and to press the executive branch when it appears to be moving slowly.

The McKinsey investigation, which the committee has described as exposing evidence of the consulting firm advising the Chinese military while receiving more than $480 million in U.S. government contracts, signals that the committee's oversight extends beyond trade policy into the question of corporate accountability in the U.S.-China relationship.

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