Why it matters

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held an unclassified hearing on September 2 examining whether U.S. national security and counterintelligence structures built for earlier threats are equipped to confront persistent campaigns by China, Russia and other adversaries. Witnesses warned that threats now extend beyond traditional espionage to cyberattacks, supply chains, critical infrastructure, emerging technologies and the private sector.

The hearing, titled "Persistent Competition & Legacy Architectures," featured three national security experts who examined gaps in U.S. defenses and coordination as foreign adversaries adopt new technologies and tactics. The hearing came two days after the committee released a bipartisan review of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations assessing how the country's national security architecture has changed since the 2001 attacks.

The Big Picture

The committee is reassessing national security structures developed during the Cold War and reshaped after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Rep. Rick Crawford (R-AR), the committee chairman, framed the hearing around the committee's bipartisan review of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, arguing that the threat environment has "drastically changed" over the past 25 years.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and National Counterterrorism Center as part of a broader post-9/11 restructuring of the intelligence community. Witnesses argued that the current threat environment increasingly involves state and nonstate actors using cyber operations, emerging technologies, supply chains, influence operations and other tools that cross traditional agency jurisdictions.

In June, President Donald Trump (R) issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 12, establishing a new cybersecurity governance framework for national security systems. The memorandum reestablished the Committee on National Security Systems, designated the National Security Agency director as the national manager for national security systems and directed the committee to establish baseline cybersecurity requirements for those systems. The policy applies to national security systems operated by the Department of War, intelligence community and federal civilian executive branch agencies.

What They're Saying

Three witnesses brought different expertise to the central question of whether the country's national security architecture can keep pace with changing threats.

Frank Cilluffo, director of Auburn University's McCrary Institute for Cyber and Critical Infrastructure, focused on the fragmentation of U.S. counterintelligence responsibilities. He argued that China conducts long-term campaigns using cyber operations, investment, research, talent recruitment, supply chains and intermediaries while U.S. agencies frequently approach individual incidents through separate cases and authorities.

Seth Jones, president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, warned that China, Russia and North Korea have advanced their conventional and nuclear capabilities to strike the U.S. homeland while new technologies have expanded opportunities for gray-zone attacks. Jones pointed to drones, artificial intelligence, cyberattacks and disinformation as threats to military bases, critical infrastructure and other domestic targets.

David Feith, a senior fellow at Hudson Institute, focused on strategic competition with China and the importance of protecting U.S. technological advantages. Feith has advocated preventing China from capturing more than 40 percent of global legacy semiconductor production and securing 30 percent U.S. onshore manufacturing of leading-edge logic chips by 2030.

Committee members also raised concerns about suspicious activity around military installations and critical infrastructure as they considered whether existing counterintelligence structures provide agencies with a sufficiently comprehensive picture of foreign campaigns.

Cilluffo argued that counterintelligence must move beyond purely protective and reactive approaches. He called for an enterprise-wide approach that better coordinates existing authorities and capabilities around priority adversary campaigns rather than creating another federal agency or transferring existing statutory authorities.

The challenge, according to Cilluffo, is determining when the government should intervene against an identified threat and when it should continue monitoring activity to uncover a broader foreign intelligence network. He argued that adversaries can pursue the same objectives through multiple channels, allowing them to shift methods when one avenue is disrupted.

Crawford connected the broader discussion to artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies, arguing that rapidly changing threats require the intelligence community to avoid the type of "failure of imagination" identified by the 9/11 Commission.

Political Stakes

Cilluffo identified fragmentation across the federal government and private sector as a central challenge, arguing that different pieces of a counterintelligence campaign can be distributed across the FBI, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, CIA, National Security Agency, Commerce Department, Treasury Department, Energy Department, Department of War, Department of Homeland Security and private companies.

The hearing also comes as the Trump administration changes cybersecurity governance for national security systems. National Security Presidential Memorandum 12 requires national security systems to meet or exceed cybersecurity standards issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and establishes government-wide oversight mechanisms for those systems.

The committee's work could inform future changes to counterintelligence coordination and information sharing. The bipartisan 9/11 Commission review released August 31 examined the national security reforms adopted after the terrorist attacks and areas where the committee believes additional attention may be warranted.

For the private sector, particularly technology companies and critical infrastructure operators, the hearing highlighted the role of unclassified commercial technology in national security competition. Witness testimony raised questions about how the government and private sector should coordinate to protect emerging technologies and critical infrastructure from foreign intelligence operations.

The Other Side

Witnesses did not argue that traditional counterintelligence should be abandoned. Cilluffo said the traditional mission of protecting classified information, identifying foreign intelligence officers and penetrations, and enforcing the law remains essential while arguing that those capabilities should be incorporated into a broader strategy for persistent competition.

Proposals for more proactive counterintelligence and cyber operations also raise questions about legal authorities, oversight and escalation. The policy challenge is how to improve coordination and disrupt foreign campaigns without unnecessarily expanding federal bureaucracy or undermining legal and civil liberties protections.

Cilluffo also emphasized that America's openness remains a strategic advantage, arguing that counterintelligence reforms should protect research, innovation and other open institutions rather than treating openness itself as a vulnerability.

What's Next

The hearing was oversight-focused, and the official hearing record does not identify specific legislation under consideration. However, the committee's broader review of post-9/11 national security architecture could inform future oversight or legislative proposals addressing intelligence coordination, emerging technologies and counterintelligence.

The committee released its bipartisan review of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations on August 31, two days before the hearing. The report and subsequent hearing reflect an ongoing examination of whether intelligence structures developed after Sept. 11 remain suited to threats involving state competition, cyber operations and emerging technologies.

The hearing was conducted on an unclassified basis and was publicly streamed by the committee.

The Bottom Line

The hearing highlighted bipartisan concerns about whether U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence structures can keep pace with foreign campaigns that increasingly span government agencies, private companies and emerging technologies. Witnesses called for stronger coordination and more proactive defenses while emphasizing that reforms must preserve existing legal authorities and protections.

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