Why It Matters

A recent Congressional Research Service report finds that the second Trump administration has placed less emphasis on promoting democracy and human rights abroad than other post-Cold War administrations, including the first Trump administration. The shift has included reductions in democracy assistance, the dismantling of much of USAID, a State Department reorganization and a new foreign policy strategy that emphasizes national sovereignty while focusing some democracy concerns on longstanding U.S. allies in Europe.

The administration has dismantled much of the federal infrastructure traditionally used to advance democratic values abroad. It largely dismantled USAID, eliminated the under secretary for civilian security, democracy and human rights, and closed most offices within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, though the statutorily mandated assistant secretary position remains. The administration also reportedly terminated most democracy and human rights projects administered by USAID and the State Department.

Congress has taken a more mixed approach. Democracy assistance funding fell from $2.9 billion in fiscal 2025 to $2.175 billion in fiscal 2026, but Congress preserved significant funding and statutory safeguards. P.L. 119-75 provided $315 million for the National Endowment for Democracy, maintained longstanding democracy- and human rights-related provisions and required reporting on changes to Leahy Law vetting following the State Department reorganization.

The administration also sought to withhold congressionally appropriated NED funding, an effort that became the subject of litigation. For fiscal 2027, the House-passed H.R. 8595 would provide $296.1 million for NED and maintain $2.175 billion for democracy assistance programs.

U.S. law identifies the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights as “principal” and “fundamental” goals of U.S. foreign policy. Since the 1970s, Congress has created statutory requirements, foreign assistance programs, sanctions authorities and other tools intended to put those goals into practice.

The changes also come as international perceptions of U.S. democracy have weakened. A 2024 Pew Research Center survey across 34 countries found a median of 21% of respondents viewed U.S. democracy as a good example for other countries to follow. Another 40% said it had once been a good example but had not been in recent years, while 22% said it had never been a good example.

The Big Picture

The second Trump administration’s November 2025 National Security Strategy marks a major departure from previous policy. CRS says it appears to be the first post-Cold War National Security Strategy that does not articulate objectives related to promoting democratic values globally. The document says the United States does not seek to impose democratic or other social change on countries whose traditions and histories differ from its own.

That approach contrasts with the first Trump administration’s 2017 strategy, which described geopolitical competition partly as a struggle between repressive systems and free societies and pledged that the United States would continue championing American values and encouraging people seeking human dignity.

The administration began reviewing nearly all foreign assistance in early 2025, paused programs globally and reportedly terminated most democracy and human rights projects administered by USAID and the State Department. It has justified some reductions in democracy promotion partly on national sovereignty grounds and has described some previous programs as advancing left-wing or liberal ideological priorities rather than core U.S. interests.

The State Department also narrowed its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in August 2025. The reports covering 2024 removed several topics that had appeared for decades but were not specifically required by statute, including fair trial rights, privacy rights, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, freedom of movement, political participation and elections, and discrimination.

The reports covering 2025 were statutorily due to Congress by Feb. 25 but had not been released as of the July 2 CRS report. CRS also reported that State Department instructions for the forthcoming reports directed diplomats to address issues including diversity, equity and inclusion policies, abortion, gender-transition surgery involving children and mass migration.

The administration has simultaneously shifted some of its democracy and human rights attention toward established European democracies. CRS says the 2025 National Security Strategy appears to be the first such document to raise democracy- and human rights-related concerns about longstanding European democracies. The strategy warns of “civilizational erasure” in Europe and expresses support for the growing influence of what it calls “patriotic European parties.”

The administration also openly supported Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government ahead of Hungary’s April elections. Orbán’s party was subsequently defeated. CRS notes that nongovernmental democracy research organizations have characterized Hungary as having experienced democratic backsliding during Orbán’s tenure.

The administration has not abandoned democracy and human rights policy altogether. It has imposed targeted sanctions in response to human rights or democracy concerns in countries including Nicaragua, Cuba, Iran and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and has taken some actions supporting international religious freedom. CRS nevertheless concludes that the administration has generally given democracy and human rights promotion less priority than other post-Cold War administrations.

The Bottom Line

Congress has preserved significant parts of the federal democracy and human rights framework even as the executive branch has reduced or reorganized many of the programs used to implement it. P.L. 119-75 directed $2.175 billion toward democracy assistance, appropriated $315 million for the National Endowment for Democracy and retained longstanding human rights provisions, including requirements connected to Leahy Law vetting.

CRS identifies several choices for lawmakers, including how much democracy assistance to fund, whether to rebuild functional offices eliminated during the State Department reorganization, whether to limit executive branch efforts supporting particular political groups in foreign elections and whether democracy programs should focus primarily on authoritarian and transitioning countries or also on established democracies.

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