Why it Matters
Fifteen years after the U.S. backed military intervention that toppled Muammar al-Qadhafi, Libya remains a fractured state split between rival governments, a breeding ground for Russian expansion, and a transit hub for hundreds of thousands of migrants. A newly updated Congressional Research Service (CRS) report reveals how the Trump administration is trying to stitch the country back together—and the stakes Congress faces in overseeing that effort.
The political fragmentation, security competition, and corruption that plague Libya create openings for adversaries. Russia has expanded its footprint in the country since 2020, reportedly using Libyan territory as a logistical hub for operations across North Africa and the Sahel. Meanwhile, the country's vast oil reserves and strategic location make it highly valuable for opportunist outsiders, even as millions of displaced people pass through its territory seeking escape.
The Big Picture
Libya has remained politically fragmented since the 2011 fall of Qadhafi, with the country divided since 2014 along a line of control near Sirte. Two rival governments now compete for legitimacy: Abdul Hamid Dabaiba leads the Government of National Unity (GNU) in western Libya, while Osama Hamad leads an Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)-backed government in eastern Libya. The LAAF attempted to seize Tripoli in 2019 but failed after UN-backed diplomacy halted fighting and produced the GNU.
Elections have proven elusive. Planned elections in 2021 were postponed amid disputes over electoral laws and constitutional arrangements. In June, Libyan bodies set a new target of 2027 elections, but a lack of national consensus over electoral and constitutional arrangements has prolonged the country's instability, as have factional disputes over energy, financial, and security issues.
The CRS report, updated on July 21, documents how competing power centers have weaponized state institutions. A UN Panel of Experts reported in March that western and eastern Libyan leaders colluded with National Oil Corporation officials to create an umbrella of impunity for large-scale irregular financing schemes, draining state coffers. Libya holds the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, with output of approximately 1.4 million barrels per day providing nearly all state revenues, making control of the energy sector a flashpoint for confrontation.
There have been glimpses of progress. Libya achieved its first unified national budget in over a decade in April, and major east-west combat has not resumed since 2020 (though militia fighting did erupt in the western port of Zawiya in May, and the GNU killing of a militia figure in Tripoli in May 2025 sparked violence and protests).
Political Stakes
The Trump administration has made Libyan unity a priority, dispatching Senior Adviser Massad Boulos, Chargé d'Affaires Jeremy Berndt, and AFRICOM officials on repeated visits since 2025 to broker the country's reunification. The administration has proposed a new, inclusive executive authority to govern Libya until elections can be held and has promoted bilateral and intra-Libyan security cooperation.
In June, the administration hosted both GNU Deputy Defense Minister Abdulsalam Al Zoubi and LAAF Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar in Washington. That move signals a willingness to engage both sides, though it also raises questions about U.S. alignment with the LAAF, which has expanded military capabilities including drones and strengthened its control in the east and south since 2024. Khalifa Haftar's sons have assumed leadership roles in the LAAF, concentrating power within the family.
The administration has also pursued commercial ties with Libya, promoting oil and gas deals with Chevron and a $20 billion production improvement deal involving ConocoPhillips and TotalEnergies. Those moves, although they may help to restore Libya's energy sector, could complicate efforts to address the corruption and collusion that the UN identified among oil officials and political leaders.
In 2025, the administration terminated some programs, pursuant to a March 2023 Global Fragility Act plan for Libya. However, it has continued International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance aimed at fostering unity among military officers from both factions.
Congress has already appropriated funding for transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and humanitarian programs for Libya from 2011 to 2024, and since 2024 has provided funds to support additional U.S. diplomatic engagement and to enable the future reestablishment of a full-time U.S. diplomatic presence in Libya. The CRS report notes that Congress may conduct oversight of and seek to shape the Trump administration's policy on Libya aid, engagement with the LAAF, security cooperation, commercial ties, frozen Libyan assets, and the U.S. diplomatic presence.
Humanitarian and Security Challenges
The humanitarian toll of Libya's instability is staggering. UN agencies identified over 936,000 foreign migrants in Libya in 2026, along with nearly 113,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Most foreign migrants arriving since 2023 are Sudanese, fleeing their own conflict. The State Department's 2025 report noted that armed groups, militias, and criminal networks have infiltrated the administrative ranks of the Libyan government and engaged in illicit activities including human trafficking.
Russia's expanding presence poses a separate challenge. Russian officials and security actors have increased their presence and influence in Libya since 2020. Libya has reportedly become a growing logistical hub for Russian operations in North Africa and the Sahel since 2024, and LAAF-controlled areas have reportedly served as a conduit for support to Sudan's Rapid Support Forces. U.S. officials have expressed concern about Russia's presence since 2018, and the UN Security Council has authorized the continuation of the United Nation's Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) through October 2026 to monitor compliance with an October 2020 ceasefire.
The Bottom Line
Libya's path to stability depends on whether rival factions can agree on power-sharing arrangements and elections before external actors—Russia in particular—deepen their foothold in the country. The Trump administration's engagement with both the GNU and the LAAF suggests an inclusive approach to unity, but that strategy carries risks. Promoting commercial deals and hosting LAAF officials could be read as tacit acceptance of a military-dominated settlement that sidelines democratic processes and entrenches corruption.
Congress faces a choice: whether to support the administration's approach to Libyan unity as currently configured, or to condition assistance on concrete progress toward the kind of unified, effective, legitimate and accountable state institutions that UNSMIL has called for. The stakes extend beyond Libya itself: how the U.S. manages its Libya policy will shape whether the country becomes a platform for Russian expansion or a partner in regional stability.
Access the Legis1 platform for comprehensive political news, data, and insights.
Spot something wrong? Report an issue with this article