Why It Matters
The Supreme Court's ruling in Monsanto v. Durnell on June 25 has fundamentally reshaped the landscape for pesticide liability claims across the country. A new Congressional Research Service report analyzing the decision found that the Court held federal pesticide law expressly preempts state tort failure-to-warn claims where the EPA has registered a pesticide without requiring a particular warning.
The case centered on John Durnell, who sued Monsanto in Missouri state court in 2019 alleging that chronic use of Roundup caused his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on the label. A jury found for Durnell in his failure-to-warn claim, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict. The EPA, however, had registered Roundup without requiring a cancer warning and has repeatedly determined that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer.
The Big Picture
The 6-2 majority, authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, reasoned that a state-imposed duty requiring a cancer warning constitutes a state requirement for labeling under the two-part test established in Bates v. Dow. Because FIFRA required Monsanto to use the EPA-approved label, which did not contain a cancer warning, the state-imposed duty was in addition to or different from FIFRA requirements. The Court held that FIFRA's express preemption provision incorporates EPA's registration decisions as requirements imposed "under" FIFRA, not just requirements spelled out in the statutory text itself.
The majority drew heavily on Riegel v. Medtronic, which construed a nearly identical preemption clause in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. The Court addressed FIFRA Section 3(f)(2), which states that registration is not a defense to a FIFRA violation and is only prima facie evidence of compliance, and held that this provision applies only to EPA enforcement actions, not to state tort suits. The majority reasoned that Monsanto's defense rested on EPA's specific determination that glyphosate-based pesticides did not require cancer warnings, not merely on registration.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. The dissent argued that FIFRA's misbranding prohibition, which requires warnings adequate to protect health and the environment, is a requirement parallel to the state tort duty, and parallel requirements are not preempted. Jackson noted that EPA regulations address acute hazards specifically but set no specific requirements for chronic risks like cancer, meaning the state tort duty fills a gap rather than conflicting with a federal requirement. She also distinguished Riegel on the ground that the Medical Device Amendments had no provision analogous to FIFRA's Section 3(f)(2).
Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the preemption analysis but raised broader constitutional questions about whether administrative action can preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause, whether FIFRA exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority by regulating intrastate pesticide sales and use, and whether FIFRA constitutes an impermissible delegation of legislative power to EPA.
The Bottom Line
H.R. 9528 would amend FIFRA's express preemption provision to clarify it shall not be construed to prohibit or otherwise limit a state law tort claim related to pesticide labeling or packaging. A separate proposal, S. 2324, would create a federal cause of action similar to state failure-to-warn torts based on pesticide labeling and packaging without changing FIFRA's preemptive scope. The Court's explicit note that similar labeling preemption provisions exist in laws covering meat, eggs, poultry, cosmetics, nonprescription drugs, and nutrition labeling suggests the preemption framework extends far beyond pesticides, potentially affecting how Congress approaches labeling disputes across multiple regulatory regimes.
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