Threats from Russia And China Increase Demands For Unified Strategy

Why it Matters

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is set to examine two of the most consequential security theaters in the world, namely the Baltic Sea and the Indo-Pacific, in a single hearing. It reflects a growing congressional view that threats from Russia and China are not just regional problems, but interconnected challenges demanding a unified strategic response. As the Trump administration recalibrates U.S. commitments to NATO allies, and as questions linger about the durability of American security guarantees, the April 30 hearing arrives at a moment when Baltic states are watching Washington with particular anxiety.

The stakes extend beyond Europe. By pairing Baltic Sea security with lessons from the Indo-Pacific, the committee is signaling that deterrence frameworks and their failures travel across oceans.

Legislative Groundwork Already Laid

In March, Sens. Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Chuck Grassley (R-IA) introduced the bipartisan Baltic Security Assessment Act, which would require greater coordination between Congress and the administration on threats to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Durbin framed the legislation in stark terms, citing "Russian and Chinese threats" and calling on the U.S. to remain "steadfast in support of our Baltic allies and the NATO alliance."

Grassley's press release introducing the bill detailed threats to the three Baltic states not just from Russia and Belarus, but also from China and Iran. That broadens the security conversation well beyond a traditional NATO-Russia lens, and helps explain why the committee including Indo-Pacific strategy.

On the Indo-Pacific side, Sen. Pete Ricketts (R-NE) used the recent milestone of 80 years of U.S.-Philippines diplomatic ties to highlight the opening of a new Philippine coast guard base on Thitu Island in the West Philippine Sea, calling the U.S.-Philippines alliance "the bedrock of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific." His framing of sovereignty, international law, and an "ironclad alliance" aligns closely with the same language used to defend Baltic security commitments.

A Year of Lobbying Pressure

The Senate hearing preview comes after sustained lobbying activity on both regional fronts throughout 2025 and into the first quarter of 2026.

The Baltic American Freedom League Inc. has filed quarterly disclosures each quarter of 2025, spending $10,000 per quarter advocating for the Baltic Security Initiative in defense appropriations, and the National Defense Authorization Act. Its first quarter 2026 filing shifted focus to the Baltic Security Assessment Act, which is the same bill Durbin and Grassley introduced in March, suggesting the legislation has become a central vehicle for the Baltic diaspora advocacy community.

The Joint Baltic American National Committee Inc. has filed consistent quarterly disclosures throughout 2025 focused on "U.S. relations with Baltic countries, Europe, Ukraine, NATO, and the EU." Notably, it was the Joint Baltic American National Committee that awarded Durbin its Baltic Freedom Award in March, the same week he and Grassley introduced their legislation.

On the Indo-Pacific side, the National Geographic Society spent $50,000 in the first quarter of 2025 and $20,000 in the second quarter lobbying on "maritime relationships in the Indo-Pacific, including preservation of economic zones." The East-West Center has filed disclosures each quarter since the third quarter of 2025, spending $40,000 to $60,000 per quarter monitoring "State Department and Congressional consideration of diplomatic programs on Asia, the Pacific and the US."

Ukraine-focused organizations have also been active. Razom Inc. spent $10,000 in the first quarter of 2025 advocating for continued U.S. military and humanitarian support for Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, and implementation of the REPO Act. The UMO & National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries spent $130,000 in the second quarter of 2025 seeking to strengthen ties between Ukraine's private defense sector and the United States.

The Strategic Logic Connecting Both Theaters

The pairing of the Baltic and the Indo-Pacific security concerns in a single hearing reflects a broader congressional argument that Russia and China are not acting in isolation, and that the lessons learned (or not) from deterrence in one theater carry direct implications for the other.

Finland and Sweden's NATO accession, which the committee supported through S.Res.646 in the 117th Congress, fundamentally changed the security geometry of the Baltic Sea. But it also raised questions about whether the alliance's eastern flank is adequately resourced and politically backed, and these questions resonate in Taiwan Strait discussions as well.

The Indo-Pacific Cooperation Act of 2019, which passed the Senate and was sponsored by then-Sen. Mitt Romney with cosponsors including Foreign Relations Committee members, explicitly called for expanding military and diplomatic alliances in the Indo-Pacific "to address challenges posed by China," and to do so in partnership with Europe. That framing has only grown more relevant as China deepens its relationship with Russia.

The Hearing

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee convenes Thursday, April 30, beginning with a business meeting to consider pending calendar items before moving to the Baltic Sea and European security hearing. The dual-theater approach, namely to examine the Baltic while drawing lessons from the Indo-Pacific, positions the session as part of a broader committee effort to build a coherent strategic framework in an era of simultaneous great-power competition across multiple regions.

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