Imported Shark Fins Undermine U.S. Conservation Efforts

Why it Matters

A new Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on shark conservation management in the United States lands at a complicated moment: the domestic regulatory framework is relatively robust, but a critical import trade gap is allowing shark fin products from countries with weaker standards to flow freely into U.S. markets, undermining decades of federal conservation work.

The U.S. has spent more than two decades building a layered legal architecture around shark species protection in the United States, from banning finning in federal waters to mandating that sharks be landed with fins attached. But those rules only go so far. Imported shark fins from countries that permit finning continue to enter the U.S. market legally, creating a conservation loophole that domestic law cannot close on its own.

The report identifies this gap as the central unresolved problem in American marine conservation policy, and it points directly at Congress as the body with the tools to fix it.

The Big Picture

The federal government manages shark fishing regulations primarily through the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, with National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries serving as the lead regulatory authority. Under that framework, Fishery Management Plans set catch limits, gear restrictions, and species-specific rules for U.S. waters.

The system has produced some concrete results. The fins-attached rule, mandated by the Shark Conservation Act of 2010, closed significant loopholes left by the Shark Finning Prohibition Act of 2000 and is considered a cornerstone of the domestic anti-finning framework.

For the Atlantic shortfin mako shark, one of the most commercially targeted species, NOAA Fisheries has imposed a zero-retention limit across all commercial and recreational fisheries. The stock is classified as both overfished and experiencing overfishing, triggering mandatory rebuilding obligations under federal law.

But the report makes clear that domestic rules face structural limits. Sharks are highly migratory. What the U.S. does inside its own waters is only part of the equation. The report points to multilateral bodies, including the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, as essential venues for pushing conservation standards internationally. Without harmonized rules, countries with weaker protections can effectively undercut U.S. efforts, functioning as what the report describes as "free rider" nations.

Bycatch compounds the challenge. Sharks are frequently caught incidentally in non-shark fisheries, and that mortality is difficult to regulate or even accurately measure. The report also flags significant scientific uncertainty in stock assessments for many species, which complicates the management decisions NOAA is required to make.

The legislative proposal most directly aimed at the import gap is the Sustainable Shark Fisheries and Trade Act, which would prohibit the importation of shark products from countries that do not meet conservation standards equivalent to those in the U.S. The bill has been introduced in prior Congresses but has not been enacted. The CRS report treats its passage as the most consequential near-term policy lever available to Congress.

Political Stakes

The report arrives during a second Trump administration that has moved aggressively on deregulation, proposed significant reductions to NOAA's budget and workforce, and pulled back from multilateral international commitments. Each of those postures creates friction with what the CRS report describes as the requirements of sound shark conservation management.

For the Administration: The report's entire management framework depends on NOAA Fisheries having the capacity to conduct stock assessments, enforce fishing rules, and implement Fishery Management Plans. Workforce reductions at the agency, if they materialize as reported, would directly degrade that capacity. The report does not editorialize on this point, but the dependency is structural and explicit throughout.

On the international front, the administration's general posture of reduced multilateral engagement creates a practical problem. The U.S. cannot pressure other nations to adopt comparable shark fin ban standards or fishing regulations through bodies like ICCAT if it is pulling back from those bodies or treating them as low priority.

The administration's use of tariffs as a trade policy tool is, in theory, a mechanism that could be directed toward conservation objectives, as the Sustainable Shark Fisheries and Trade Act would do. But the report notes that trade leverage has not been pointed in that direction under current policy.

Any rollback of existing Fishery Management Plan restrictions, including the shortfin mako zero-retention rule, in response to fishing industry pressure would conflict directly with the Magnuson-Stevens Act's mandatory rebuilding requirements for overfished stocks. That is not a matter of policy preference; it is a statutory obligation.

For Congress: The report is, in practical terms, a legislative roadmap. The import trade loophole requires a statutory fix. The Sustainable Shark Fisheries and Trade Act is the vehicle most clearly designed to address it, but it has stalled in previous Congresses. Whether the current Congress moves it forward will depend on whether members see endangered shark species and marine conservation policy as priorities worth expending political capital on.

The SHARKS Act, introduced in the 118th Congress, would establish a Shark Depredation Task Force under the Secretary of Commerce, addressing a separate but related set of concerns around shark interactions with fishing operations. That bill also remains unenacted.

For the fishing industry: The report does not take sides in the tension between commercial fishing interests and conservation requirements, but it is clear that the Magnuson-Stevens Act does not give NOAA discretion to ignore overfishing findings. Industries that depend on shark fishing face ongoing restrictions that are legally mandated, not discretionary, as long as stocks remain depleted.

For the public: The stakes here extend beyond any single species. The report frames shark conservation management as a test case for whether the U.S. can maintain credible environmental standards in a globalized trade environment. If domestic protections can be circumvented through imports, the conservation value of those protections is diminished.

The Bottom Line

The U.S. has built a serious domestic framework for shark species protection, anchored in the Magnuson-Stevens Act and strengthened by successive legislation over more than two decades. That framework has real teeth, including zero-retention limits on overfished species and a fins-attached rule that closed major loopholes.

What it does not have is a mechanism to stop shark fin products from countries with no comparable standards from entering the U.S. market. That gap is the report's central finding, and closing it requires Congress to act.

The political environment makes that harder. Proposed cuts to NOAA, reduced international engagement, and deregulatory pressure all run against the grain of what the report identifies as necessary. Whether Congress moves the Sustainable Shark Fisheries and Trade Act, or any comparable legislation, will be the clearest indicator of whether federal shark conservation management policy advances or retreats in the current term.

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