Why It Matters

Saudi Arabia may soon possess nuclear weapons, depending on what Congress does with the draft bilateral nuclear agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia now sitting on President Trump's desk.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation, updated May 26, 2026, lays out the central tension plainly: Saudi Arabia wants nuclear energy and has said it wants the ability to enrich its own uranium. The United States has long required partners to forgo exactly that capability before any nuclear cooperation deal can move forward.

Congress now must sort out whether this is a needle that the Trump Administration has successfully threaded.

The Big Picture

Saudi Arabia has demonstrated interest in civilian nuclear power for a few years now. In July 2017, the kingdom approved a National Project for Atomic Energy, targeting large and small reactors for electricity production and water desalination. The motivation is understandable: in 2023, oil generated roughly 41 percent of Saudi electricity, while natural gas generated about 58 percent. Burning fossil fuels domestically is expensive when you can export them instead.

Saudi Arabia holds 16 percent of the world's proven crude oil reserves and has the fourth-largest natural gas reserves globally, making it the second-largest energy consumer in the Middle East. Freeing up more of those resources for export, while meeting growing domestic electricity demand, is a core economic priority.

The kingdom has since built out a regulatory architecture, establishing a Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Commission in March 2018 and creating the Saudi Nuclear Energy Holding Company in March 2022. International bids for two 1.4 gigawatt electric reactors at Khor Duweihin, a coastal site near the Qatari and UAE borders, have drawn interest from China National Nuclear Corporation, Électricité de France, the Korea Electric Power Corporation, and Russia's Rosatom.

The sticking point throughout every prior negotiation has been enrichment. Saudi Energy Minister Khalid Al-Falih said in 2019 that the kingdom wants "the full cycle, from producing uranium, to enriching the uranium, [to] using the uranium." In January 2023, he reiterated that Saudi Arabia intends to use its domestic uranium resources to produce low-enriched uranium fuel.

The CRS report is explicit about why that matters: both highly enriched uranium and plutonium can fuel certain reactors, but both are also used as fissile material in nuclear weapons. A civilian enrichment program and a weapons-capable one can share the same infrastructure.

Saudi Arabia acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1988 and has had a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 2009. But the kingdom has not concluded an Additional Protocol, which would give the IAEA broader authority to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities. In 2024, Saudi Arabia did rescind a Small Quantities Protocol that had previously held most safeguards procedures in abeyance, a modest step in the right direction.

Press reports have also raised concerns about potentially undeclared nuclear activities, including a possible uranium milling facility allegedly built with Chinese assistance. Saudi authorities denied those reports in 2020, but the kingdom's CSA would require it to declare such a facility to the IAEA.

What They're Saying

During Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to the United States in November 2025, the two governments signed a "Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation." The White House described the declaration as building "the legal foundation for a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar nuclear energy partnership" and said it "confirms that the United States and American companies will be the Kingdom's civil nuclear cooperation partners of choice."

As of May 2026, President Trump is reviewing a draft 123 agreement, named for Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which governs all U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation. If signed, the agreement goes to Congress for a 90-day review. Congress can pass a joint resolution of disapproval, which would block the deal if it became law.

A complicating factor: a provision of current law, specifically Section 1264 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, normally bars the executive branch from submitting the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) required for congressional review of 123 agreements with countries, like Saudi Arabia, that have not accepted enhanced international safeguards. The Trump Administration waived that restriction. Published excerpts of the administration's waiver report state that the draft agreement would be implemented with a Bilateral Safeguards Agreement that, "with the involvement" of the IAEA, would employ "additional safeguards and verification measures to the most proliferation sensitive areas of potential nuclear cooperation." Those measures have not been publicly specified.

The administration has also said the bilateral safeguards agreements reflect a "firm commitment to nonproliferation" and are "not about enrichment," but has not released detailed plans for what the cooperation would actually entail.

Political Stakes

For the Administration

The Trump White House has framed the Middle East nuclear partnership in commercial and geopolitical terms. American nuclear companies, including Westinghouse, stand to win billions in contracts if the deal moves forward. The administration is competing directly against Rosatom and Chinese state nuclear firms for Saudi Arabia's business, and losing that competition would hand rivals a major strategic foothold in the Gulf.

But the administration's decision to waive the statutory restriction on submitting the NPAS, and its apparent flexibility on enrichment, creates political exposure. If the safeguards provisions in the final agreement are seen as insufficient, the White House will face accusations of trading away a cornerstone of U.S. nonproliferation policy for economic gain.

The regional security environment adds another layer of risk. Researchers attributed more than 1,200 missile and rocket attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and government facilities to Iran and Iran-backed groups between February and May 2026 alone. Siting nuclear facilities in an active conflict zone, where Iranian proxies have demonstrated both capability and willingness to strike critical infrastructure, is a risk the administration will have to decide whether or not to take.

For Congress and Both Parties

Congress has the clearest institutional stake in this fight. The 90-day review window is not a rubber stamp; lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have previously conditioned U.S. nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia on the kingdom accepting enhanced safeguards and forgoing enrichment and reprocessing. Through Fiscal Year 2025, Congress used appropriations riders to enforce exactly those conditions.

Whether that coalition holds in the 119th Congress, under a Republican majority aligned with the Trump Administration's broader Gulf strategy, remains to be seen. The CRS report notes that the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation debate is also entangled with broader U.S. efforts on Saudi-Israeli diplomatic normalization, giving members additional incentive to tread carefully.

For Democrats, the deal offers a clear line of attack: the administration softened decades of nonproliferation standards to close a business deal with a kingdom whose crown prince has publicly suggested it would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran does. That argument has bipartisan resonance, particularly among members focused on arms control.

For the Public

The stakes extend well beyond Washington. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly stated that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will seek to match that capability. A U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal that does not firmly close the door on enrichment could accelerate exactly that dynamic, potentially triggering a broader Middle East nuclear competition.

The Bottom Line

Congress is about to receive a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that the Trump Administration negotiated without requiring the kingdom to formally forswear uranium enrichment, the central condition the United States has demanded of partners for years.

The details of the safeguards arrangement remain classified or unspecified, which means lawmakers will be reviewing a deal whose most consequential provisions are not yet public. The 90-day clock, once it starts, will force a yes-or-no vote on an agreement that carries implications not just for the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, but for the global nonproliferation architecture the United States has spent decades building.

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