Why It Matters
Mongolia's relations with neighboring China and Russia have only strengthened at a time when both countries pose security risks to the United States. As a result, Congress is reexamining the U.S.-Mongolia bilateral relationship.
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report published Sept. 16 on U.S.-Mongolia relations lays out policy tensions that Congress and the Trump administration will need to navigate as Washington deepens its Indo-Pacific posture.
Mongolia sits between Russia and China, pursues a formal "third neighbor" policy of cultivating ties with the United States and other non-bordering nations, and holds extensive deposits of copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, uranium, tin, and tungsten, with extractive industries accounting for over 90% of Mongolian exports.
The Trump administration paused immigrant visa issuance to Mongolian nationals in January as part of a broader review of countries deemed high-risk for public benefits reliance and imposed a 10% tariff on Mongolian goods under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, a tariff that expired July 24. The administration also sanctioned a Mongolian International Criminal Court judge in December 2025 under Executive Order 14203 for involvement in proceedings targeting Israeli nationals, even as Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the United States and Mongolia in July as "proud third neighbors and fellow democracies."
The Big Picture
The U.S. and Mongolia upgraded their bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership in 2019, committing to cooperate on democracy, Indo-Pacific security, and law enforcement. The House reaffirmed that partnership through a resolution in the 116th Congress (H.Res. 1100) and 117th Congress (S.Res. 36), and Mongolia is among 17 countries whose legislatures participate in the House Democracy Partnership.
On security, Mongolia ranked as the 8th largest contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations as of 2024, having sent more than 22,000 troops between 2002 and 2024, and the annual Khaan Quest multinational military exercise, co-sponsored by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, continued as of 2026.
China accounted for 89% of Mongolian exports and 40% of imports in 2025, while Russia supplied 25% of imports and over 94% of petroleum imports. In August, Mongolia experienced a nationwide fuel shortage attributed to supply disruptions from the Russia-Ukraine war and the U.S.-Iran conflict.
The stalled Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, a proposed Russia-Mongolia-China natural gas route, remains a geopolitical flashpoint. Mongolia could earn up to $1 billion annually in transit fees if completed, but critics warn it could deepen the country's dependency on both neighbors.
The State Department's own 2025 Investment Climate Statement warned that "caution is warranted" in Mongolia's mining and energy sectors due to investor risk, regulatory unpredictability, and political sensitivity.
The Bottom Line
In the 119th Congress, the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Policy Act (H.R. 6877, S. 288) would direct the U.S. Agency for Global Media to establish Voice of America Mongolian-language programming for speakers in Mongolia, the People's Republic of China, and Russia, and authorize $2 million for each of fiscal years 2026 and 2027 for such purposes. Whether Congress moves to codify a more coherent Mongolia strategy, or leaves the administration to manage the contradictions between partnership rhetoric and restrictive trade and visa policies, will shape how much leverage Washington retains with one of the few democracies bordering both Russia and China.
Access the Legis1 platform for comprehensive political news, data, and insights
Access the Legis1 platform for comprehensive political news, data, and insights.
Spot something wrong? Report an issue with this article