U.S. Withdraws Funding From Hemisphere's Primary Multilateral Forum

Why It Matters

A new Congressional Research Service report on the Organization of American States (OAS) lands at a moment of maximum uncertainty for U.S. engagement with the Western Hemisphere's primary multilateral forum, and puts Congress squarely in the middle of a funding fight that could reshape American influence across the region.

The Trump Administration has not requested a single dollar for the OAS in its FY2027 budget, assessed dues, nor voluntary contributions.

That's a sharp break from FY2024, when the United States provided $90.3 million to the organization. The U.S. is responsible for 49.99 percent of the OAS Regular Fund, the account that covers the organization's day-to-day operations.

The central tension here is: the U.S. helped build this institution, has historically used it to advance its own economic, political, and security goals in the hemisphere, and is now signaling it may walk away from it entirely at a moment when the region is contending with gang violence in Haiti, democratic erosion in multiple countries, and the ongoing fallout from Venezuela's political collapse.

The Big Picture

The OAS was established in 1948 as a forum for the 35 independent countries of the Western Hemisphere to address issues of mutual concern. Today, 34 member states participate. Nicaragua withdrew in November 2023 after the OAS General Assembly declared its 2021 elections lacked democratic legitimacy. Cuba has not participated since 1962. Venezuela has not participated since 2023.

The organization operates on four pillars: democracy promotion, human rights protection, economic and social development, and regional security cooperation. Its total expenditures in 2025 were $165.2 million.

For decades, OAS decisions largely reflected U.S. policy preferences. That alignment was especially strong during the Cold War and again in the 1990s, when there was a broad hemispheric consensus around democratic governance and market liberalization. Since the early 2000s, the report notes, increased ideological polarization among member states has made it harder to establish a common agenda and harder for Washington to drive outcomes.

The OAS's own finances have been strained for years. The organization's Audit Committee has warned for more than a decade that annual budgets have "fallen significantly short of covering both programmatic and administrative requirements." Member states have repeatedly added responsibilities without adding money to match.

Against that backdrop, the Trump Administration's funding decisions land with particular force.

How the Administration Moved Against the OAS

The administration's posture toward the OAS has been shaped by two executive orders issued in the opening weeks of President Trump's second term.

Executive Order 14169, signed January 20, 2025, paused U.S. foreign assistance for 90 days pending review. That order triggered the suspension of 49 OAS projects funded through U.S. voluntary contributions. By January 2026, U.S. agencies had lifted suspensions on 18 of those programs and terminated the remaining 31, which had unexecuted balances totaling $13.1 million.

More than 50 OAS personnel were separated from the organization as a result. Among the terminated programs was a counterterrorism information-sharing initiative that had been launched with U.S. support during Trump's first administration.

Executive Order 14199, signed February 4, 2025, directed the Secretary of State to review all international organizations for consistency with U.S. interests and potential for reform. The OAS was not among the 66 organizations from which the President directed withdrawal in January 2026, but the review remains ongoing.

At the June 2025 OAS General Assembly, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau suggested the United States may withdraw from the OAS unless the organization demonstrates more concrete results on challenges like Venezuela and Haiti.

On dues, the administration paid approximately 63 percent of the U.S. assessed contribution in FY2025 and approximately 62 percent as of March 1, 2026, for FY2026. The OAS charter provides no mechanism to revoke voting rights for non-payment, which limits the organization's leverage.

In March 2026, the administration publicly criticized the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for holding hearings on U.S. military counternarcotics strikes in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, asserting the IACHR lacked competence to review the operations and calling on the commission to stay out of matters subject to active domestic litigation.

Political Stakes

The 119th Congress has already shaped some of the contours of this debate. The National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75) provided funding for U.S.-assessed contributions to international organizations and designated $2.5 million in voluntary contributions to support OAS efforts to combat human trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean. The legislation also directed the State Department to use the U.S. voice and vote to push budgetary and management reforms at the OAS and to prioritize democracy and human rights activities.

That's Congress pulling in one direction while the administration pulls in another.

The FY2027 appropriations process is where the confrontation becomes concrete. The administration has proposed a $5 billion "America First Opportunity Fund" that it says could be used for international organizations, among other foreign policy priorities, but has not requested any specific funding for the OAS. Congress must now decide whether to designate funding directly, appropriate a lump sum and leave allocation to the executive branch, or allow the administration's zero-dollar posture to stand.

Beyond appropriations, the report identifies several other pressure points. The Senate confirmed Leandro Rizzuto as U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS in October 2025. The Senate also retains authority to weigh in on the administration's ongoing review of international organization membership under E.O. 14199, particularly if the administration moves toward withdrawal from OAS-related treaties. Two inter-American treaties have been awaiting Senate advice and consent for decades: the American Convention on Human Rights since 1978 and the Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Firearms Trafficking since 1998.

For Democrats, the administration's posture hands them a ready-made argument about ceding hemispheric leadership and abandoning institutions built to advance U.S. interests. For Republicans, there is a genuine policy debate about whether the OAS is delivering results on the issues the administration cares most about: migration, drug trafficking, and democratic accountability in Venezuela and Cuba.

The Bottom Line

The United States has built the OAS and has been its largest funder for decades. It historically used it as a vehicle for advancing its own hemispheric agenda, but the Trump Administration is now signaling it may stop paying for it.

The CRS report makes clear that Congress has both the tools and the responsibility to weigh in through appropriations, oversight, and legislation. The 56th regular session of the OAS General Assembly is scheduled for Panama City from June 22 to June 24, 2026. That deadline gives Congress a narrow window to signal where U.S. policy is actually headed before the next chapter of this debate plays out on an international stage.

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