Spotlight on Pentagon's Growing Maintenance Costs for Existing Weapon Systems

Why it Matters

The Pentagon spends billions of dollars every year just keeping its weapons working. Not buying new ones. Not upgrading them. Simply maintaining what it already has. And according to a new report from the Government Accountability Office, that bill is growing faster than the military is managing it.

Released April 23, the GAO report found that of 36 weapon system sustainment reviews conducted by the Department of Defense for fiscal years 2023 and 2024, 14 systems across the Army and Navy showed "critical" operating and support cost growth. The findings come as Congress is scrutinizing defense budgets with unusual intensity, and when the Trump administration is pressing the Pentagon to find savings without sacrificing readiness.

The report says the Army is leaving more than $130 million in potential savings on the table by failing to complete a software update it has already committed to.

A Recurring Problem In The Paper Trail

The report is part of a statutorily mandated series, required under federal law, that compels DOD to conduct sustainment reviews, and GAO to report the results to Congress. Prior reports that covered fiscal years 2021, 2022, and beyond have documented the same pattern: cost growth identified, partial action taken, follow-through incomplete.

GAO also looked back at nine sustainment reviews from prior cycles to assess what corrective action DOD had actually taken. It concludes that DOD has addressed some problems, but not all of them, and the Army in particular has fallen short.

The CROWS Problem

The most concrete example in the report involves the Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS), a remote-controlled weapons mount used on Army ground vehicles. CROWS allows soldiers to operate weapons systems from inside an armored vehicle, reducing exposure to hostile fire.

The Army's own remediation plan for CROWS called for a software update to address a top maintenance issue driving up costs. That update has not been completed across all units. According to GAO, the failure to implement the update on a timely basis means the Army is forgoing more than $130 million in savings over the remaining life of the program.

This is not a case of GAO discovering a problem the Army didn't know about. The Army identified the issue, developed a plan to fix it, and then did not fully execute that plan. GAO's single recommendation in the report is directed squarely at the Army, asking it to ensure that units implement the CROWS software update as called for in the existing remediation plan.

What DOD's Sustainment Reviews Are Supposed to Do

DOD is required by law to conduct weapon system sustainment reviews, which are formal assessments of the operating and support costs for major weapon systems over their lifecycle. When those costs grow beyond expected thresholds, the system is flagged as having critical cost growth, and the relevant military branch is expected to develop and execute a remediation plan.

The process exists because weapon system lifecycle costs are notoriously difficult to control. A fighter jet or a combat vehicle is not just expensive to buy. It is expensive to fuel, maintain, repair, and upgrade over decades of service. Operating and support costs routinely exceed acquisition costs over a system's full life. Defense spending efficiency, in this context, is less about procurement and more about the long, unglamorous work of keeping equipment functional at a manageable price.

GAO serves as an independent check on whether DOD is actually following through. It has now documented, across multiple reporting cycles, that critical cost growth persists and remediation plans go unfinished, suggesting DOD's internal accountability mechanisms are not working as intended.

Army Cost Growth Management Under the Microscope

While both the Army and Navy had systems flagged for critical cost growth, GAO's lone recommendation targets the Army specifically. The CROWS situation illustrates a broader concern about Army cost growth management, namely the gap between planning and execution.

The report does not allege fraud or deliberate mismanagement. What it documents is a failure of follow-through, an institutional pattern where problems are identified, plans are made, and implementation stalls.

The Army has not publicly responded to the recommendation as of the report's release date. DOD's formal response to GAO recommendations, when it comes, will indicate whether the Army accepts the finding and commits to a timeline for completing the CROWS software rollout.

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