Why It Matters
A recent Supreme Court ruling on presidential control over executive officials could raise new constitutional challenges to certain powers exercised by the head of the Government Accountability Office, potentially prompting Congress to reconsider the agency's legal authorities.
A new Congressional Research Service (CRS) report examines unresolved constitutional questions surrounding the appointment, removal, and powers of the comptroller general, who leads the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The office's unusual structure combines congressional oversight responsibilities with presidential appointment and limited removal protections.
The president appoints the comptroller general to a 15-year term, subject to Senate confirmation. Removal requires impeachment or a joint resolution of Congress for cause. A congressional commission must recommend at least three candidates, though CRS notes uncertainty about whether the president must choose from that list. The Supreme Court's June 29 decision in Trump v. Slaughter sharpened questions about GAO's remaining executive functions without invalidating its authority.
The Big Picture
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established GAO as an agency "independent of the executive departments," combining Treasury auditing and claims-settlement functions with congressional investigative duties. Lawmakers cited the comptroller's "semijudicial" responsibilities when establishing presidential appointment and replaced a concurrent resolution with a joint resolution for removal, requiring presidential agreement or a veto-proof congressional majority.
The 1980 appointment law requires at least three commission recommendations. Its Senate report said the president "retains the sole authority of nomination" and "would give great weight" to recommendations, while the House described the process as a "restriction" short of an absolute limitation. All three comptrollers nominated since 1980 came from commission lists.
In Bowsher v. Synar (1986), the Supreme Court invalidated deficit-reduction powers under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, ruling that a comptroller controlled by Congress cannot exercise executive power. The Court severed those powers without invalidating the removal arrangement. GAO now primarily serves Congress, but CRS identifies potentially executive functions, including settling federal accounts, suing to enforce the release of impounded funds, and assessing civil penalties under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.
The Bottom Line
In Trump v. Slaughter, the Supreme Court identified binding rulemaking, enforcement through administrative adjudications and civil litigation on behalf of the United States as core executive powers requiring presidential control. The report says the comptroller's exercise of potentially executive functions "may result in continued questions" under both Bowsher and Trump v. Slaughter. Neither decision resolved the constitutionality of GAO's remaining authorities.
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