When it Comes to China, Forced Labor Laws May Get a Second Look

Why It Matters

A Congressional Research Service report published May 1 puts a spotlight on Section 307 forced labor imports enforcement, a statutory tool that has transformed from a largely dormant provision into one of the most active levers in U.S. trade policy. It is a now a front-line tool that sits squarely at the intersection of the Trump administration's China strategy and its broader trade agenda.

The report examines Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which bans the importation of goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part by forced labor, convict labor, or indentured labor. For most of its existence, the law had limited teeth. A loophole known as the "consumptive demand" exception allowed forced-labor-produced goods to enter the U.S. if they weren't made domestically in sufficient quantities to meet American demand.

That changed in 2015, when Congress passed the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act (P.L. 114-125), eliminating the exception entirely. The result: a surge in enforcement that has outpaced the prior 85 combined years of the law's existence.

The central tension the report surfaces is this — as the U.S. has built more aggressive import restrictions against forced labor regimes, the complexity of global supply chains and the pressures of ongoing trade negotiations with China are creating friction that Congress and the administration will have to navigate.

The Big Picture

The CRS report traces the law's origins to 1930, noting that Congress enacted it primarily to protect domestic workers from competing with cheap foreign forced labor, not for humanitarian purposes. That framing matters for understanding how the law has evolved.

The most significant recent development is the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA, P.L. 117-78), enacted in December 2021. The UFLPA created a rebuttable presumption that all goods produced in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or by certain listed entities, are goods produced by forced labor and are therefore banned under Section 307 — unless an importer can prove otherwise.

That shift in burden of proof is consequential. Under the UFLPA, the obligation falls on importers, not the government, to demonstrate that their goods are clean. It represents a fundamental change in trade enforcement philosophy, one that the CRS report flags as a defining feature of the current regime.

As of December 1, 2024, U.S. Customs and Border Protection reports 51 active Withhold Release Orders (WRO) and 9 Findings globally. WRO, the primary enforcement tool under the Section 307 tariff law, bar entry of specific goods suspected to be made with forced labor. They have expanded from targeting individual manufacturers to broader industry- and country-wide orders.

Supply chain complexity remains the core enforcement challenge. Goods may pass through multiple countries before entering the U.S., obscuring their origins and making it difficult for CBP to trace products back to forced labor sources. The report notes that Congress retains oversight over CBP's administration of WROs and may consider further legislative action to expand or refine the law's reach.

The CRS also notes that Congress might assess the role of the International Labour Organization and whether to push the executive branch to elevate forced labor as a priority in international trade forums — a recommendation that carries its own political complications given the current administration's posture toward multilateral institutions.

Political Stakes

For the Trump Administration

The administration's aggressive tariff escalation against China creates both alignment and tension with the forced labor imports ban framework.

On one hand, blocking goods produced by forced labor fits neatly within the administration's "America First" manufacturing posture. On the other, the administration's ongoing trade negotiations with China raise the question of whether UFLPA enforcement could become a bargaining chip. If the administration is seeking a broad deal with Beijing, the forced labor import restrictions regime — which directly targets Xinjiang supply chains — is a pressure point that China has consistently pushed back on.

The report also intersects with the administration's move to close the de minimis loophole, which previously allowed goods valued under $800 to enter the U.S. duty-free with minimal scrutiny. The CRS notes the connection directly: many forced-labor goods from Xinjiang entered via low-value e-commerce shipments. Tightening de minimis rules reinforces Section 307 enforcement, and the two policy tracks are now linked.

For Congress

The report is, at its core, a tool for congressional oversight. It lays out the enforcement architecture and signals where gaps remain. Key questions for Congress include whether CBP has sufficient resources and staffing to administer the growing number of WROs, how to handle supply chain opacity that allows goods produced by forced labor to enter through third countries, and whether to expand the UFLPA's rebuttable presumption model to other high-risk regions beyond Xinjiang.

The CRS's suggestion that Congress assess the ILO's role is notable given that the current administration has deprioritized multilateral institutions in favor of bilateral deal-making. If Congress wants to push the executive branch toward greater international coordination on forced labor enforcement, it may need to do so legislatively.

For Democrats

Democrats have broadly supported the UFLPA and stronger Section 307 enforcement, framing it as both a human rights and a trade fairness issue. The report gives Democrats a platform to press the administration on whether its China trade negotiations are compromising enforcement, and to push for greater transparency from CBP on how WROs are being administered.

For the Public

At the consumer level, the stakes are about what ends up on American shelves. The forced labor imports ban is designed to ensure that goods made under coercive conditions don't enter U.S. commerce. But the report's acknowledgment of supply chain complexity means enforcement is imperfect. Goods can move through intermediary countries in ways that obscure their origins, and the burden on importers to prove compliance is only as effective as the documentation systems that exist to support it.

The Bottom Line

The CRS report on Section 307 forced labor imports arrives at a moment when enforcement is stronger than it has ever been, but the pressures on that enforcement are also growing.

Two things stand out. First, the UFLPA's rebuttable presumption model has fundamentally changed how the U.S. approaches import restrictions on forced labor goods, placing the evidentiary burden on importers rather than the government. That is a durable structural shift that will shape trade compliance for years. Second, the intersection of Section 307 enforcement with the administration's China trade negotiations is a live tension that Congress will need to watch closely. If forced labor enforcement becomes subordinate to deal-making, the legal architecture built over the past decade could be undermined not by legislation, but by diplomatic accommodation.

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