Why It Matters
The Supreme Court held that the immigration statute sets no evidentiary standard for border officers deciding whether returning lawful permanent residents are seeking admission. A new Congressional Research Service (CRS) report examines the 6-3 ruling in Blanche v. Lau, issued June 23.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers therefore do not need clear and convincing evidence before treating a returning permanent resident as an applicant for admission. For the Trump administration, the ruling removes that evidentiary requirement as a statutory prerequisite for the covered border determinations. For travelers with open criminal cases, the question is whether they can be denied reentry before their charges are adjudicated.
The Big Picture
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a returning permanent resident generally is not regarded as seeking admission. Six exceptions apply, including when a CBP officer determines the person has committed certain listed offenses, such as a crime involving moral turpitude. The statute is silent on how an officer makes that determination.
Muk Choi Lau was charged with trademark counterfeiting under New Jersey law and left the country while the case was pending. At a New York airport, a CBP officer treated him as an applicant for admission and paroled him in for deferred inspection. He later pleaded guilty, and the Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings.
The Board of Immigration Appeals, relying on its 2011 precedent, upheld removal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled for Lau on March 4, 2025, finding that a pending charge alone could not meet the clear and convincing standard. That decision conflicted with decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, according to the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court granted review Jan. 9 and vacated and remanded the Second Circuit's judgment.
Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett. The majority said the Second Circuit's standard "is not derived from statute." Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented. She argued that an officer must first determine that one of the six exceptions applies, and that the majority's approach lets officers rely on evidence obtained later.
CRS says the Court held only that the INA imposes no clear and convincing requirement at ports of entry. The Court did not decide whether Lau's offense was a crime involving moral turpitude, according to the Supreme Court opinion. The Supreme Court docket records that the judgment issued July 27.
The Bottom Line
Lower courts may now have to decide what standard, if any, governs CBP determinations. Congress can leave the statute as written and let those courts clarify the burden, or it can codify the clear and convincing standard or another evidentiary burden. Legal commentators cited in the analysis split on the question, with one arguing a pending serious charge should suffice and others favoring a high standard at ports of entry.
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