Why It Matters
A GAO report published June 9 finds that the Pentagon's costliest weapon systems have consistently exceeded cost estimates and delivery schedules since 1990, wasting billions of dollars and decades of development time. The report, titled "Weapon Systems Acquisition: Beyond Business as Usual — Using Leading Practices to Curb Waste and Save Billions," was prepared for a roundtable convened by the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Delivering on Government Efficiency.
The Department of Defense plans to invest more than $2.4 trillion to develop and acquire its costliest weapon systems. GAO found that the acquisition process driving that investment is misaligned with leading commercial product development practices. DOD's budget process requires securing long-term weapon program funding early, before military leaders fully understand what capabilities are needed. That creates an incentive to award large development contracts and obligate funds quickly so funding is not redirected to another program. GAO found that success is often measured by money spent rather than capability delivered.
The expected time frame for major DOD programs to deliver an initial capability now exceeds 12 years. The Army's Integrated Visual Augmentation System illustrates the cost. After three acquisition efforts spanning eight years since 2018, the estimated $1.8 billion program produced nearly 10,000 units of its first two versions. Those units do not meet soldiers' needs and will go into storage, with some potentially used for testing, rather than being fielded. The Space Force's Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX), intended to replace the existing Global Positioning System ground control system, spent more than 13 years in development and more than $7 billion before the Space Force terminated it in April.
GAO contrasts this record with how leading commercial companies operate: They iteratively develop business cases, regularly reassess plans, and increase investment as products demonstrate progress. DOD has not fully adopted iterative development as a founding principle for all weapon system acquisition programs.
Broader Context
The report was prepared for a June 9 subcommittee roundtable titled "Getting Taxpayers a Better Bang for Their Buck from Military Contracts," chaired by Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN-2). It draws on GAO's decades-long body of work on DOD acquisition and cross-references a companion report on commercial product development practices (GAO-25-107130). GAO Director Shelby Oakley, Assistant Inspector General for Audit Carmen Malone, and Citizens Against Government Waste Director of Policy and Research Sean Kennedy participated in the roundtable.
GAO has made hundreds of recommendations to DOD over the years to improve weapon system program outcomes, and DOD has yet to implement many of them. In November 2025, DOD issued a policy memorandum aimed at revamping the defense acquisition system and announced plans to maximize acquisition flexibility. GAO found that despite those changes, DOD has not yet fully embedded iterative development as a core acquisition principle.
Supply chain fragility compounds the structural problem. GAO Director Shelby Oakley, who leads GAO's Contracting and National Security Acquisitions work, noted during the roundtable that supply chains are among the drivers of cost increases and schedule overruns. She cited the B-52 program specifically: diminishing manufacturing sources and spare-parts shortages reduced aircraft availability and forced cannibalization of existing aircraft, according to The Daily Caller's coverage of the roundtable.
The Bottom Line
GAO did not make new discrete recommendations in this report. Instead, it highlighted hundreds of recommendations from its previous work that DOD has yet to fully implement and said it would continue monitoring the department's progress. GAO argues that DOD should move away from slow, linear development approaches and more fully embrace iterative development practices used by leading commercial companies.
The report found that GAO has documented persistent problems with the Pentagon's weapon acquisition system for decades and has made hundreds of recommendations to improve outcomes, many of which remain unimplemented. With more than $2.4 trillion in planned weapon system investment ahead, GAO argues that improving the speed and cost-effectiveness of the acquisition system is a national imperative.
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